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Abstract Emerging biotechnology may soon allow the
creation of genetically human organs inside animals, with
non-human primates (henceforth simply ‘‘primates’’) and pigs
being the best candidate species. This prospect raises the
question of whether creating organs in primates in order to
then transplant them into humans would be more (or less)
acceptable than using them for research. In this paper, we
examine the validity of the purported moral distinction
between primates and other animals, and analyze the ethical
acceptability of using primates to create organs for human use.
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Animal research
Millions of scientific experiments are conducted on ani-
mals around the world every year. In the UK alone, over 4
million experiments were conducted on animals in 2012.
The vast majority of research is conducted using mice
(74 % of experiments in the UK), but larger animals and
primates are also used, and over 50 % of experiments in
the UK were on genetically modified animals (UK Gov-
ernment 2012). Increasing awareness of animal welfare
issues among the public and professionals has led to
increased regulation of the use of animals in research, with
a particular focus on the 3 Rs: replacing, reducing and
refining the use of animals in research (NC3RS 2013).
The 3 Rs are in turn based on two key principles: pro-
portionality and subsidiarity. These state, respectively, that
any use of animals for research must be proportional to the
prospective benefit, and that animals should only be used
when no reasonable alternative is available. But even these
principles rest on the assumption that research on animals
is acceptable in some circumstances. It is widely agreed
that the use of animals for testing of medical products is
justified, given that the alternative is to pose serious risks to
humans. However, many animal rights activists believe
than any experimentation on animals is wrong, whatever
the benefits to humans. While most people believe that it is
reasonable to use some animals for research, these activists
would argue that it is wrong to do so regardless of the type
of creature in question. If all animals were accorded equal
moral status, this conclusion would indeed be correct.
However, most people regard animals as being morally
inferior to humans, and the question of exactly how to
ascribe moral status to animals is a controversial one.
The 2012 Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness by
three eminent neuroscientists focuses on the criterion of
consciousness, stating that ‘‘the weight of evidence indi-
cates that humans are not unique in possessing the neuro-
logical substrates that generate consciousness. Non-human
animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other
creatures, including octopuses, also possess these neuro-
logical substrates’’ (Edelman 2012). This would suggest
that many more animals have the capacity for conscious-
ness than is widely believed, and in turn that they should
perhaps be accorded higher moral status. Using con-
sciousness as the criterion for moral status appears to cast
the net too wide, as it would include almost all animals.
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In contrast, most modern conceptions of the moral status
of animals have tended to be linked to their capacity for
personhood, which most animals are seen as lacking.
Indeed, one of the most widely used definitions of per-
sonhood is ‘‘humanism’’, which states that only humans are
persons and reveals an implicit bias against non-human
animals; this casts the net too narrow. A less anthropo-
centric definition is used by Peter Singer, who defines a
person as a ‘‘rational and self-conscious being’’ (Singer
1993). This definition would include some animals, and
particularly primates, Singer argues that there is more
difference between an oyster and an ape than between an
ape and a human, yet the important distinction is still
mistakenly held by many to be between humans and other
animals. Indeed, Singer has stated that ‘‘we are great apes’’
ourselves (Singer 2001).
Jeff McMahan offers a different account of why harm-
ing animals is less objectionable than harming people:
The Time-Relative Interest Account offers an expla-
nation of why the killing of animals is less seriously
objectionable than the killing of persons. Because the
psychological capacities of animals are significantly
less well developed than those of persons, the range
of goods accessible to them is narrower and the
degree of psychological unity within their lives is
less. They therefore have a weaker time-relative
interest in continuing to live than a person normally
does. (McMahan 2003, p. 204)
While McMahan’s account could be seen as legitimizing
animal research, it should be noted that the time-relative
interests account would yield different conclusions
regarding different species. For example, while mice have
much less psychological capacity than humans, pigs may
have more than mice, and primates may have more than
any other animal (with the possible exception of cetaceans
such as dolphins, which are not normally used as a model
for humans in research). Whilst the time-relative interests
account provides justification for worrying less about using
some animals in research, its ‘‘sliding scale’’ nature cannot
tell us whether the use for research of animals with slightly
less psychological capacity than humans is justified. The
question remains regarding where the ‘‘cut-off’’ should
be—between mice and pigs, between pigs and primates, or
between primates and humans.
Primate research
Many countries have taken steps to prohibit experiments on
the most ‘‘human-like’’ animals, non-human primates.
These include Norway, Austria, the Netherlands and New
Zealand; (Wikipedia 2013) Spain has officially extended
human rights to great apes (Glendinning 2008) In the UK,
research on primates is permitted, but is only approved by
the Home Office when there is no satisfactory alternative;
2,186 primates (mainly macaques) were used for research
in the UK in 2012 (UK Government 2012). Research using
great apes such as chimpanzees and gorillas is not currently
licensed in the UK. Despite the claims by some activists
that primate research is not necessary, many scientists
maintain that key medical discoveries depended on such
experiments. These include:
• polio vaccines, which have virtually eliminated the
disease in the USA and Europe since the 1950s
• life-support systems for premature babies
• kidney dialysis
• anti-rejection drugs for organ transplant recipients
• deep brain stimulation to suppress the symptoms of
Parkinson’s disease
• surgical treatment for macular degeneration—an incur-
able eye disease that is the primary cause of blindness
in older people
• new techniques in stroke rehabilitation therapy
• drugs to combat asthma. (Welcome/MRC 2006)
It should be noted, however, that the fact that primates
were used in the research that led to these advances does
not mean that these advances could not have been made
without using primates; other animal models could have
been used instead, or humans could have volunteered.
Today, primates are mainly used in research concerning
six areas of medicine: Parkinson’s disease, reproduction,
cognition, vaccines, vision and stroke. The use of primates
is necessary in some cases because they are the animals
that are most like us, and provide the most accurate animal
model. Given that the only alternative would be to use
humans, the subsidiarity criterion is met, and given the
substantial potential benefits of some of the treatments that
may result, the proportionality test is also met. It should be
noted, however, that to the extent that primates actually
meet the criteria for personhood, they should be treated as
persons rather than animals, making the proportionality and
subsidiarity principles irrelevant. For the purposes of this
paper, we will assume that the current consensus position is
correct, and primates (with the possible exception of great
apes) are not persons. The European Commission’s Sci-
entific Committee on Health and Environmental Risks
(SCHER) has stated that ‘‘because non-human primates
have close and sometimes unique similarities to humans,
their use remains necessary in the safety testing of new
pharmaceuticals and in several areas of biomedical
research, such as research on infectious diseases and on the
brain.’’ (SCHER 2009) However, the fact that primates
provide the best animal model does not mean that that
model is actually of sufficient predictive power: it has been
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argued that ‘‘studies comparing toxicity in animals,
including nonhuman primates, consistently reveal positive
and negative predictive values far less acceptable than
those needed to substantiate the claim that they can be used
to predict human response’’ (Shanks and Greek 2008).
Nonetheless, the consensus remains that the use of animals,
including primates, in research is necessary and justified.
The Nuffield Council on Bioethics concluded that: ‘‘the
concept of the Three Rs and the hybrid moral position
underlying the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986
(some absolute limits, and a case by case weighing of the
costs and benefits) could be accepted, or at least tolerated,
by all those holding reasonable views.’’ (Nuffield Council
2005) (Although some would question why those who
believe in animal rights should tolerate what they cannot
accept.)
This claim that research on primates is necessary
because they are most like us represents the crux of the
ethical dilemma: in a sense, it is an inevitable consequence
of trying to find an accurate animal model that any such
model will have similar intellectual and emotional capa-
bilities to ourselves. However, animal rights activists
would argue that the fact that primates are like us does not
necessarily mean that we should treat other animals with
any less respect than we accord primates. We empathize
more with the pain of primates because their expression of
suffering is so similar to ours. But the mere fact of this
‘‘unique similarity’’ does not mean that the suffering of
pigs or even mice is any less acute; they may just express it
in a less human way. It can be argued that our reluctance to
use primates for research is itself a product of
anthropocentrism:
Empathy with animals most likely is a psychological
side-effect of adaptive empathy among humans, and
its expression is largely determined by the degree of
similarity between animals and us in morphology and
behaviour. As a result, compassion with animals is
vulnerable to anthropocentric bias, prejudice, and
deception, and animal protection based on compas-
sion is likely to be unfair towards animals. (Wurbel
2009)
Here, the argument is that we should not overlook the
possibility that we accord more moral weight to primates
partially because they look and act more like us rather than
because they embody characteristics that designate moral
worth. As Thomas Nagel pointed out, we cannot imagine
what it is like to be a bat (Nagel 1974). While we think we
can easily imagine what it’s like to be a gorilla, that does
not mean our guesses are accurate; equally, our anthropo-
centric guess that other animals do not perceive suffering at
the same level may also be mistaken. The point here is not
that research on primates should not be conducted, but that
it is not obviously true that doing so is much (or any) worse
than conducting it on pigs, dogs or mice. Now let us turn to
a novel potential use of primates that may be easier to
justify.
Primates, pigs and organ creation
Recent advances in regenerative biotechnology have
enabled scientists to grow rat organs in mice using induced
pluripotent stem cells derived from rats and injected into
mice embryos (Kobayashi et al. 2010; Isotani et al. 2011)
The result is a rat/mouse chimera: a mouse with, for
instance, a rat kidney. It is likely that this same technology
will allow human organs to be grown inside pigs or pri-
mates within one or two decades, depending on which
species is more suitable. The potential advantages of using
this technology are tremendous: this would not only rep-
resent a new source of organs with which to reduce the
number of people dying every day waiting for a transplant,
but could also significantly reduce the rejection rate of
transplants (Shaw 2014). All transplant recipients must
take immunosuppressant drugs for the rest of their lives in
order to prevent the organ being rejected, and the failure
rate is relatively high despite these drugs. However, if the
stem cells used to create the new organ inside an animal are
derived from the recipient, the chances of rejection would
be close to zero. Even if such autologous transplants prove
too costly, IPS cell lines can be used to create allogenic
human leukocyte antigen-matched organs; while not as
ideal as autologous transplants, these are nonetheless less
likely to be rejected than transplants from whichever
donors die on a given day. This novel biotechnology does
raise some safety and other ethical concerns in addition to
those raised by using primates, which we discuss elsewhere
(reference 1). To summarize, the risk of zoonosis (gener-
ation of new cross-species viruses) is close to zero. No
humans have been infected with a retrovirus following
traditional xenotransplantation of an organ from a pig
(Boneva and Folks 2004), and any tiny risk would be
reduced further by the use of fully human organs obtained
from chimeras, although precautions would still have to be
taken given the potential harm caused by any new virus
Mattiuzzo et al. 2008). Furthermore, any risk of the animal
developing human mental features or being able to produce
part-human offspring could easily be avoided by ‘‘knock-
ing out’’ genes for neuronal and gamete development in the
human cells. While the chimera organs technique is still
experimental and would have to undergo thorough clinical
trials, it is quite possible that it will become a proven
therapy within a decade. This paper proceeds on the
assumption that those trials will establish the efficacy and
safety of this regenerative technology, thus moving the
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creation of chimera organs from the realm of experimental
research to that of established treatment.
Proportionality
The key question is the same as that in the earlier xeno-
transplantation debate: whether it would be acceptable to
use animals for the purpose of producing organs for
humans. It seems reasonable to assume that most people
would accept the use of pigs for this purpose. Unlike pri-
mates, pigs are routinely eaten by millions of people every
day. (For many people, the fact that it is regarded as
acceptable to eat pigs rests on the assumption that they are
treated humanely until killed; while such humane treatment
could be provided for GM chimera pigs, they would have
shorter lives, as they will be sacrificed whenever the organ
is large enough to be transplanted.) In terms of propor-
tionality, using pigs for this purpose seems far less of a
problem than using them for food or for research. While
the use of pigs for this purpose might be acceptable, it is a
distinct possibility that primates might have to be used
instead because of the aforementioned greater similarity
with humans. However, the use of primates is more ethi-
cally challenging. Even if it is generally wrong to use
primates for research, could it be acceptable to sacrifice
them for life-saving clinical purposes?
First let us consider the use of primates to create organs
in terms of proportionality. Although it might seem callous
to be willing to create and sacrifice a primate for its organs,
the potential benefits of doing so should not be underesti-
mated. It is not just about saving human lives and reducing
future human suffering; if the primate option was used,
people wouldn’t need to wait several years for someone to
die and donate a kidney (for example) as the organ could be
grown from scratch. In the US patients wait an average of
2 years for a liver, and in Germany the wait for a kidney is
6 years. As such, the removal of suffering would be much
greater than it might at first appear. (Of course, there are
other objections to creating chimera organs: that it is
playing God, or against human dignity. These points are
considered in another paper.)
Another potential objection is that using primates for
research is acceptable because only a few experiments are
needed, and then the knowledge is obtained (or not);
however, in the case of organ creation, we are essentially
advocating the creation of primate factories that will be in
operation for many years to come. This raises the question
of how many primates would be needed each year. This
basically equates to: how many people would require an
organ each year? In the UK, 1,000 people die every year
waiting for an organ, and more would need organs to
improve quality of life, so maybe 2,000 primates would be
needed per year. In contrast, 2,186 primates were used for
research in the UK in 2012 (UK Government 2012)
Therefore, a rough estimate is that roughly the same
number of primates would be used each year for organ
production as for experiments—a substantial increase, but
perhaps justified given the greater direct benefit compared
with their use for research. The fact that great apes might
be necessary due for organ creation also raises the question
of whether the distinction between lesser and great apes is
relevant in this context. Most primates used in research,
and all used in the UK, are smaller primates. While these
could be used for organ production (especially for chil-
dren), bigger primates are more likely to be appropriate
donors.
Subsidiarity
While the creation of human organs inside primates
appears to meet the proportionality criterion (with the
possible exception of great apes), the subsidiarity principle
raises further questions. One of the most common objec-
tions to using primates (and other animals) for research is
that doing so is not necessary or useful even when scien-
tists say it is. However, this objection is easily overcome in
the case of using primates to create organs. If these organs
are not created, people will die or continue to suffer. As
such, proving that there is ‘‘no alternative’’ would be much
easier for organ creation than for research that might never
bring any benefit, at least under a permissive reading of the
subsidiarity principle that would allow this use of primates
if there is no proven non-problematic alternative. However,
a more restrictive reading of the principle would be that
using primates to create organs would not acceptable as
long as there may be possible alternatives that are equally
effective but less problematic. It could be argued that ‘‘no
alternative’’ is never true in the case of organs because
many people do not donate their organs after death, and
there are other potential sources of organs than primates.
This is true in a general sense, but for the specific people
who will die soon without an organ there really is no
alternative, suggesting that the restrictive reading of the
subsidiarity principle is too strict. Therefore, using prima-
tes for this purpose appears to be more justified than using
them for research, at least in terms of expected utility. Of
course, if it becomes possible to create entire solid organs
using scaffolds in laboratories at some point in the future,
the subsidiarity principle would then yield the conclusion
that the use of primates (or any animals) for this purpose
would not be justified. Another interesting issue concerning
subsidiarity arises from the possibility that creating organs
inside pigs might be workable but less effective than using
primates. In this context, it would be questionable whether
even the more permissive reading of the principle would
allow the use of primates.
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Similarly, it could also be argued that primates should
only be sacrificed to create organs when it’s necessary to
save life rather than to improve quality of life. While
lessening the suffering of dialysis for kidney patients, for
example, is a good goal, it is not clear that it is worth
sacrificing a great ape for; in contrast, such a sacrifice
seems more appropriate if a human will die without it.
Furthermore, it could be argued that using primates for
allogenic transplants would be more ethical than using
them for autologous transplants. Most people who seek an
autologous transplant will only need one organ, meaning
that the others will go to waste unless they are used for
allogenic HLA-matched transplants. (In allogenic organ
creation, all organs from an animal can be used as the
matching is not so specific, although this increases the risk
of rejection.)
Finally, if the use of pigs or primates for this purpose
was deemed inappropriate because of the suffering it would
cause them, and the fact that there are other means of
obtaining organs, there is one way in which all animal
suffering could be avoided while still using them to grow
human organs. It could eventually be scientifically possible
to ‘‘knock out’’ the genes for major brain development in
animals, enabling anencephalic pigs or primates being used
to grow organs. While this would certainly avoid the pos-
sibility of any suffering (except perhaps that experienced
by the mothers of the anencephalic animals), it might
paradoxically be regarded as worse in some respects, as it
would involve deliberately creating animals that would
normally have moral status, but whose integrity has been
seriously compromised (Nuffield Council 2005). However,
given that this solution would cause no suffering and could
save thousands of lives over several decades, concerns
about integrity might not win the argument. If we really
wished to avoid inflicting any suffering on animals, while
also saving many human lives, the creation of organs in
anencephalic (‘‘brainless’’) pigs or primates might be the
solution. Nonetheless, it is not obvious that the animals
used to create chimera organs would suffer much more
than those currently used in research, and those who wish
to reduce suffering might actually be more troubled by the
creation of anencephalic animals for integrity reasons.
Should only great apes be suitable for the creation of
chimera organs, the same idea of avoiding major brain
development might be considered as a way to avoid any
possibility that using these animals would amount to using
persons. This line of reasoning invites the thought that
human anencephalics could be created for the same pur-
pose as well. If there is no overriding objection to doing
this in great apes, why indeed would things be different in
humans? On the other hand, if the moral reluctance we feel
with the idea of creating human anencephalics as organ
sources has any ethical weight, the question arises why this
would not also count against doing this in apes.
One last objection to creating human organs in primates
is that many primate species are endangered, while humans
are flourishing and consume increasing amounts of the
Earth’s natural resources; how can using endangered ani-
mals to create human organs be justified, given this con-
text? This is a valid argument, but the same applies to using
primates for research. It is sadly true that humanity oper-
ates on an anthropocentric basis. Furthermore, the people
who would benefit from this biotechnology are likely to be
wealthy citizens of developed countries, while less lucky
people elsewhere in the world continue to starve. Again, it
is sadly true that Western societies are somewhat self-
focused. Of course, if access to chimera organs was also
provided in developing countries, this concern would be
addressed. These are problematic issues, but they are sys-
temic and do not in themselves offer a decisive argument
against using primates to create chimera organs.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we use primates for research because they
are the animals that are most like us, despite the concern
that they may not actually be biologically enough like us
for such research to be useful. The problem posed by the
fact that we may need to ‘cannibalize’ our closest primate
relatives for organs parallels the problem that these rela-
tives also constitute the best animal research model. While
it would require initial research on primates, the use of
primates for organ creation would represent a shift from
their use in medical research, which is dwindling in any
case, to their use as an essential resource for clinical
medicine. This shift means that the question of whether a
given research project will ultimately result in benefit is
removed, as each sacrificed primate would save at least one
life, and could improve several more. The criteria of pro-
portionality and subsidiarity are likely to be met by the
creation of organs inside primates, provided that no alter-
native artificial sources of organs such as ‘‘lab-grown’’
organs are developed, and that the creation of chimera
organs in pigs or other animals is not viable. Currently,
chimera organs appear to be the most promising new
source of organs due to technical hurdles in creating bionic
or lab-grown organs, but all such alternative sources should
be actively pursued, as any success in creating organs via
other means could avoid the ethical issues posed by using
chimeras. While this preliminary analysis suggests that
using primates to grow human organs should be more
acceptable than using them for research, a public debate on
the issues raised in this paper is clearly required.
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